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This paper draws upon original research undertaken in the United Kingdom and Sweden. It
considers the enforcement of regulations associated with the limitation of air emissions from
shipping. Speciﬁcally, it considers the enforcement of regulations pertaining to the Baltic and
North Sea emission control areas (ECAs). The paper outlines the steps that have been taken
to ensure vessel compliance in these ECAs. It describes the effectiveness of such enforce-
ment as well as current limitations and gives speciﬁc emphasis to the views of vessel
operators. The paper ends with a series of recommendations that have been arrived at
following discussion of the research ﬁndings with a select group of industry experts.
Keywords: regulation; globalisation; ports; pollution; environment; emissions
Background
The latter half of the twentieth century saw increased interest amongst academics in the problem
of the environment, not least how to reconcile economic, social and environmental interests
(Dobson 1996, 395). Within the maritime ﬁeld concern with pollution, and the potential for
shipping business to negatively impact on the marine environment and related biodiversity, has
also grown. Marine pollution in the form of oil and chemical spills has attracted much media
attention in the last 30 years as high proﬁle incidents taking place in European waters (e.g. oil
spills from the Sea Empress, Braer, Erika and Prestige) or particularly sensitive environments
(e.g. Exxon Valdez) have hit the headlines. It has also attracted the attention of academics
concerned to offer insight into risk mitigation and the role of regulation and of good governance
in mitigating such impacts. For example, Radović et al. (2012) offer an analysis of the best
strategies for the detection and assessment of oil and chemical spills arising from shipping
incidents in support of more effective damage limitation, whereas Xu (2009) offers an analysis
of liability in the event of pollution damage at sea. In the face of increased public and policy
concerns, the shipping industry has sought actively to curtail the negative environmental
externalities arising within the shipping sector, in particular that of marine pollution. The
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has dedicated annex VI of the MARPOL
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convention to regulations concerned with the limitation of air pollution including, but not
exclusively, CO2 emissions. Regulation 14 is speciﬁcally concerned with the regulation of
sulphur dioxide (SOx) and particulate matter, and in 2006, 2007, and 2012, emission control
areas (ECAs) restricting the emission of SOx were established in the Baltic, North Sea, and
North American zones, respectively. While the pollution restrictions that were initially estab-
lished by MARPOL were originally considered to be ineffective with regard to environmental
impact by some commentators (Ringbom 1999) plans to restrict sulphur levels to 0.1% by 2015
in ECAs are thought by some to represent a ‘step change’ in practice.
These developments have been followed with some interest in the trade and wider
press and they have continued to remain central to the news agenda (see for recent
examples Green 2011; Eilperin 2012; World Maritime News 2012). They have also
provided the focus for research in the academic community of a largely business
oriented/technical nature. For example, Eide et al. have considered the cost-effectiveness
of different measures which act to reduce CO2 emissions. They conclude that according to
the criteria they establish, ‘several measures are cost effective’ (Eide et al. 2009, 381),
depending on the price of fuel, but that at the time of publication these excluded the use of
solar panels, fuel cells and waste heat recovery due to the initial high investment costs
associated with such technologies. In a similar vein, Longva and colleagues have con-
sidered energy efﬁciency design indexes (EEDI) and the establishment of associated
targets (Longva, Eide, and Skjong 2010); Notteboom (2011) has considered the relation-
ship between the use of low-sulphur fuel and competitiveness in the ro-ro sector; and
Schinas and Stefanakos (2012) consider the economic and business implications of
sulphur regulations.
This paper is written from a rather different perspective. In relation to any maritime
regulatory regime, one of the concerns for ship operators is that regulations serve to
create a ‘level playing ﬁeld’ whereby socially responsible operators are not penalised
for voluntary compliance with regulation whilst less scrupulous operators establish
competitive advantage via regulatory avoidance. It is therefore essential that new
regulations relating to the requirement for vessels to use expensive low sulphur fuel
in speciﬁc ocean zones are effectively enforced. With its strong emphasis on the
enforcement of emissions regulation, this paper therefore considers some of the issues
that have arisen in conjunction with efforts to control air emissions in the North Sea
and Baltic ECAs. It outlines the steps that have been taken to enforce compliance with
the requirements of the ECAs and describes the limitations on the effectiveness of
such enforcement. The paper further considers the responses of the industry to the
introduction of ECAs and highlights the problems that some companies have had in
ensuring compliance. It ends with some policy recommendations which have been
arrived at following discussion of the research ﬁndings with a select group of industry
experts (termed a Delphi group).
The regulation of deep-sea shipping
In the twentieth century, the international shipping industry became increasingly regulated
such that by 2013 two main bodies—the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and
the International Labour Organisation (ILO)—were responsible for formulating the bulk
of international regulation pertaining to shipping. Such international regulations were
2 H. Sampson et al.
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developed in addition to those introduced by speciﬁc nation states and regional bodies
such as the European Union.
The same period witnessed the increased ascendance of the transnational corporation
and the phenomenon that is termed globalisation. Globalising processes are described as
those that free capital from the conﬁnes of national boundaries (Held et al. 1999)
producing ‘footloose’ capital that is free to ‘scour the world’ for cheap sources of labour
(Hirst and Thompson 1999). In shipping, globalisation can be seen to have taken place
with the ﬂagging-out of national ﬂeets to open registers (Sampson 2013). As such, by
2012, 57% of the world ﬂeet was registered with the 10 largest open registers (UNCTAD
2012). Such ﬂagging-out was undertaken in pursuit of competitive advantage (Bergantino
and Marlow 1997) achieved as a result of freedom to recruit cheap labour from develop-
ing countries and regulatory avoidance (Alderton et al. 2004).
As a result of globalisation, and in spite of the expansion of the regulatory scope of the
IMO in particular, the enforcement of international regulations pertaining to shipping has
presented considerable challenges to those seeking to retain control over the industry. As
ships ﬂagged-out, the traditional means for enforcing regulations relating to shipping, via
ﬂag states, was eroded. New open registers were seen to exercise little regulatory control
over their ﬂeets (Donaldson 2007) and a series of shipping disasters with a considerable
ﬁnancial impact on tourism and aquaculture increased political concerns about marine
governance and in particular standards pertaining to international vessels. The response by
the IMO was to agree mechanisms by which nation states (also termed for this purpose
port states) ratifying international regulations were free to enforce related standards in
relation to all vessels calling at their ports rather than simply their own ﬂeet of registered
vessels. Port state control, as this was termed, came into its own in the latter part of the
twentieth century as regional groups of port states began to collaborate with regard to
inspection and the targeting of vessels for inspection. For example, the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding was established amongst 14 participating states in
1982. It has subsequently grown to include 27 states and has been regarded as particularly
effective in establishing higher standards for shipping and something akin to a ‘culture of
compliance’ amongst operators whose vessels visit European ports (Bloor et al. 2013c).
The website for the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on port state control describes
the purpose of port state control as follows:
Port state control is a check on visiting foreign ships to see that they comply with interna-
tional rules on safety, pollution prevention and seafarers living and working conditions. It is a
means of enforcing compliance where the owner and ﬂag State have failed in their respon-
sibility to implement or ensure compliance. The port State can require defects to be put right,
and detain the ship for this purpose if necessary. It is therefore also a port State’s defence
against visiting substandard shipping. http://www.parismou.org/organization/about_us/
2010.12.28/Principles.htm accessed 28/05/2013
This broad regulatory overview provides the backdrop for the research described herein
relating to the speciﬁc enforcement of pollution controls in European waters in the period
2010–2012.1
Methods
The research which underpins this paper was funded by the UK Economic and Social
Research Council. It was undertaken in the period 2010–2012. The research considered
Greener shipping? Issues associated with emission control areas 3
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both the North Sea and Baltic ECAs and, as such, ﬁeldwork was focussed in both
Sweden and the United Kingdom. In total 50 recorded semi-structured interviews were
conducted with port state inspectors, regulators, ship operators and other key industry
stakeholders. These augmented the ﬁeldnotes that were made in the course of 16 ship
inspections which were observed by researchers at 7 different port state control ofﬁces
in the United Kingdom and Sweden. In addition, researchers analysed the records of
Falmouth bunker deliveries, results of fuel sample tests taken in Sweden and Holland,
the records of a large commercial fuel testing company and the results of a company in-
house survey relating to the ﬂeet experience of fuel sampling and testing by statutory
authorities.
A slightly different interview schedule was utilised in relation to each group of
interviewees (e.g. regulators vs. ship operators) and the overall responses of each group
of interviewees were compared with each other augmenting the initial intra-group analy-
sis. Recorded interviews were transcribed and coded. Initial analysis and interpretation
was augmented using the established technique of analytic induction (Cressey 1953;
Bloor 1978). In this system, searches are made for deviant cases that do not ﬁt with a
working ‘hypothesis’ and these are considered in relation to the need to modify and
extend the conclusions in order to deepen the analysis. Thus, in this paper we report the
ﬁndings to reﬂect the nuances in the expressed views of stakeholders. Initially the coding
of transcripts was undertaken manually by Bloor. Subsequently, in re-considering the
ﬁndings in relation to the issues reported here, the transcripts were re-analysed and coded
with the assistance of the software programme NVIVO by Sampson. In line with standard
practice amongst qualitative researchers, no attempt is made here to quantify these data as
this would not be appropriate. Thus, no ‘trends’ or statistics are reported as such. The
transcripts from the study have been anonymised and placed in the ESRC archive where
they can be referenced for re-evaluation and conﬁrmation.
Towards the end of the research phase of the project, key ﬁndings were presented to a
panel of experts (an electronic ‘Delphi group’) with the intention of arriving at a
consensus relating to recommendations arising from the research. The Delphi group
comprised one ship operator manager, one regulator, one port state control ofﬁcer and
one member of an environmental NGO. The recommendations which emerged as a result
of this process are presented at the end of the paper and the process itself is further
discussed in Bloor et al. (2013b).
The enforcement of regulations pertaining to emission control areas
Within the ECAs, an initial limit on the sulphur content of fuel was set at 1.5%. This
reduced to 1% in July 2010 and it is set to be reduced further (to just 0.1%) in January
2015. Further to this, since January 2010, all vessels calling at EU ports have been
required to burn fuel with a sulphur content of just 0.1% whilst at anchor within port
limits or at berth. Where operators prefer, sulphur abatement technology may be deployed
(in the form of scrubbers) as an alternative to the purchase and consumption of the
relatively highly priced low-sulphur fuel.
The enforcement of the regulations relating to air pollution in the ECAs has been
undertaken by port state control ofﬁcers. Two primary methods have been adopted: the
examination of paper records such as vessel log books and bunker fuel delivery notes and
the analysis of fuel samples. Fuel samples are not extensively used however and in 2010
4 H. Sampson et al.
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just 149 samples were analysed in Sweden. Other EU countries (e.g. Netherlands,
Germany, Denmark) analyse similarly small numbers of samples annually whilst the
United Kingdom does not generally make use of fuel sample analysis in its enforcement
of air-pollution regulation.
In addition, experiments have been conducted with the analysis of samples taken from
vessel exhaust plumes using aircraft and lasers mounted at the entrance to the port of
Gothenburg. Whilst the Swedish Maritime Authority has discontinued its use of aircraft-
mounted laser monitoring equipment, there is some evidence that such experiments have
had a deterrent effect.
In Sweden, an incentives programme is in place such that more favourable fairway
dues2 (and to a lesser extent port charges) are levied from vessels demonstrating constant
use of low-sulphur fuel. This measure complements and encourages compliance with low-
sulphur fuel regulations but it does not substitute for local enforcement.
Problems for enforcement
The research highlighted several problems in relation to enforcement of the regulations.
Of greatest concern is the difﬁculty for port state control ofﬁcers in identifying fraudulent
paperwork where this may exist. Bunker fuel delivery notes are generally checked in
conjunction with log books in order to ascertain compliance with fuel usage in ECAs. As
one port state control inspector described it, inspectors examine:
Mostly bunker delivery notes, which proves what type of bunker they are using and then you
have the log book entry for the change over because normally they will burn high sulphur
outside the ECA area. So when they are coming in, so like what time they change over.
[Inspector]
A second port state inspector conﬁrmed this with his account:
We will be checking the bunker delivery note, it will be cross checking with oil record book,
2 entries. If the vessel is coming into the ECA area from outside, so then you would like to
see the log book entries about the change over things, obviously change over time is
depending on the type of the ship, type of engine and the arrangement of change over, also
the capacity of the, if they are using the same bunker tank, service tank, then the capacity of
the service tank and how long it will take, so there are some calculations to verify that they
are burning the compliant fuel when they are inside the ECA, so that has to be demonstrated.
[Inspector]
Sulphur levels on bunker delivery notes are often hand written and are frequently illegible
(not least because the carbon copy deteriorates in storage), whilst log books are open to
inaccuracy. An inspector explained his concerns as follows:
I think the regulation for this bunker [. . .] is not fully implemented in this country because I
think you will ﬁnd [in] foreign countries [. . .] all this [is] closely controlled and monitored,
which is not the case here. [Inspector]
Reliance on the checking of paperwork may not, as a result, be adequate in the face of
deliberate contravention of regulations by unscrupulous ship operators. Furthermore,
vessels which are transiting the ECAs rather than calling at ports within them may not
be subject to such inspections and could escape detection.
In order to detect contravention of the regulations, by vessels transiting an ECA, the
use of laser monitoring equipment might appear to be ideal, although thus far the
intention has only been to use this technology as a screening device to identify potential
Greener shipping? Issues associated with emission control areas 5
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candidates for fuel sampling and testing. As previously noted, experiments with air-
borne laser detection equipment have been discontinued. This was due to the hazards
presented to aircraft in attempting to capture samples from vessel plumes. Such techni-
cal problems are compounded by the relatively high cost of such measures although the
presence of ‘sniffer planes’ sends a powerful message to vessels and could act as a very
useful deterrent.
Finally in relation to the sampling of fuel, there are a couple of problems which are
worth noting. The ﬁrst issue relates to the time which is generally taken when samples are
sent away to independent laboratories for testing. By the time that the results of the
sample analysis are available to port state control ofﬁcers, it is highly likely that a vessel
will have sailed. Some port state control ofﬁcers have access to fuel testing procedures
that offer them rapid results. However, in the United Kingdom it was reported that such
samples were rarely, if ever, taken. An inspector commented that:
[. . .] they tell me that they get, once they reach the continent places like Germany in particular
and to a lesser extent Denmark and Holland, they are having samples of their service tanks
taken, and they some of them have been taken to court and they feel it is over the top, but as
far as anything about what we do here none at all. [Inspector]
The response of ship operators to the introduction of ECAs and problems of
compliance
Incentives to avoid regulation
A major ﬁnancial incentive currently exists with regard to the avoidance of regulations
pertaining to the use of low-sulphur fuel in ECAs. This results from the high price
differential between low-sulphur fuel and higher-sulphur alternatives which, at time of
writing (May 2013), is $23.00 per tonne. Once the 0.1% sulphur limit comes into
force in ECAs in 2015, this incentive to non-compliance will be considerably
increased, since (unless vessels have ﬁtted scrubbers) they will have to operate
continuously within ECAs on distillate fuel, currently costing $280 per tonne more
than high-sulphur fuel.
Logistical reasons for non-compliance
Another reason that companies may fail to comply with regulations is more logistical in as
much as vessels with single service tanks may experience problems with fuel changeover.
This is likely to be particularly the case when vessels are only intermittently trading in an
ECA and where companies and chief engineers are inexperienced in making the requisite
changeover. In well-established companies, procedures for fuel changeover are generally
established by the company in consultation with chief engineers who are then expected to
follow company procedure for changeover and demonstrate such compliance with proce-
dure to port state control ofﬁcers. Not only does this mean that ECA regulations should be
effectively complied with, it also prevents the kind of engine damage that can occur if fuel
changes are attempted too quickly. An operator explained:
We have company procedures that they must follow [. . .] And that is part of our SMS with
DOC as well, because you will get asked that on the audit. The audit they can ask me for, we
have just had Isle of Man now [the ﬂag state], and he said show me your changeover
procedure and I will then go into the technical manual, show our actual PDF on this of
what we would do, and he will say show me your chief doing it, and I will have to go back
6 H. Sampson et al.
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and look into the records and extract and say this vessel was going into Long Beach you can
see what the chief did. [Employer]
But not all vessels follow an invariant changeover procedure and in the course of an
observed PSCO inspection, a chief engineer remarked that he was following a different
changeover procedure from that which had been logged by his predecessor. Changeovers
on single-service-tank vessels, which involve ﬂushing through the service tank with low-
sulphur fuel oil, may result in inadvertent non-compliance since only very small quantities
of high-sulphur fuel need to remain in the service tank for the additional low-sulphur
fuel oil (which frequently has a sulphur content of 0.98%, 0.99% or 1.00%) to be thrown
‘off-spec’.
Problems of off-spec fuel and bunker fuel delivery notes
There was some conﬁdence expressed in the major suppliers of bunkers in as much as
operators did not expect such suppliers to be found to be guilty of providing fuel that was
different to the speciﬁcation of the order (off-spec fuel). One such view was expressed as
follows:
It wouldn’t be because it was off-spec when it was delivered because it is tested and
guaranteed to be spec as per that note, as per that reﬁnery, as per those people we are
working with every day. [Employer]
Such conﬁdence may have accumulated as a consequence of the regular practice in many
major shipping ﬁrms of sending samples of the bunkers provided for analysis at their own
choice of laboratory. If such analysis demonstrated that the fuel was off-spec with regard
to sulphur content, operators suggested that they would immediately be in touch with their
ﬂag state administration and any other relevant authorities.
It is interesting to note however that despite the conﬁdence expressed by some
operators in the major suppliers of bunkers, this practice of sampling fuel had developed
in the context of experience of less trustworthy suppliers.3 One operator told of a case
when 4.5% sulphur fuel oil was bunkered (unknowingly) by one of their vessels in
Denmark. He explained how:
We had this once last year, the vessel bunkered off the coast of Denmark and the fuel was
4.5 sulphur, how or why 4.5% MGO was even in Denmark in the ﬁrst place we don’t know,
it could have come from someone as a bad batch, it could have got in somewhere and they
thought let’s get it out and we ended up taking it onboard the ship. And the danger I had
was she burnt the fuel, the chief made a mistake in his calculations, he didn’t come to me
and he was burning the fuel. I went to the vessel in Latvia and it came through and I said
‘chief whatever you do, do not burn that fuel’, he had 80 ton of it, I said ‘do not burn that
fuel’, and he said ‘but I only have 25 ton left sir’. I said ‘what do you mean you have only
got 25 ton left?’, and he said ‘I have been burning it’. So she had burnt 50 ton of fuel in the
Baltic region, and if the Port State had gone onboard and said let me see the sample. . .!
[Employer]
Such experiences had led to the alternative view that bunker suppliers could not always
be trusted and that some would, as a consequence, be open to propositions from
operators seeking to avoid compliance with ECA regulations via the use of fraud in
the form of the provision of fraudulent bunker fuel delivery notes. One operator put it
this way:
Greener shipping? Issues associated with emission control areas 7
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We deal with um, yeah we see ‘bad’ bunkering companies on a daily basis. There is no. . .
around the world there is no trick that they haven’t tried, I mean they have a huge bible
of how to cheat shipping companies for their fuel. So it’s really about the BDN [bunker
fuel delivery note]—you can easily forge the BDN if that’s what you want to do.
[Employer]
The potential for fraud was increased by what was acknowledged to be the very poor
standard of bunker fuel delivery notes.4 As one operator put it, the standard of bunker fuel
delivery notes was:
Very poor, very, very poor. [. . .] it depends where you are,[. . .] But even Europe sometimes it
is very poor, it is kind of sometimes a barge turns up and he throws the line and he pumps it
off and away he goes, no one really cares you know and it is very poor to be honest. I think
that the standard should be a lot better really. [Employer]
This produced a view amongst some operators that enforcement of the ECA regulations
actually had to be ‘beefed up’ and tightened rather than ‘watered down’. As one operator
described:
There really has to be a much more elaborate system in place to ensure that there is going to
be compliance. This is really what we want to opt for going forward. [Employer]
However, this view was not universally held and there were concerns expressed about the
establishment of greater surveillance, particularly in the form of the sampling of fuel by
port state control ofﬁcers.
A different problem was brought to our attention by one ship manager whose
contracts with charterers provided that it was the charterers rather than the ship man-
agers who organised the supply of bunkers to vessels. Regardless of where the supply
was sourced from, the ship manager sent samples to a single company for testing and
reported that whilst they had sometimes been assured by a charterer that the fuel
supplied was compliant, their tests had revealed that this was not the case. An inter-
viewee explained:
Everything is sampled through the [company name] but we source our bunkers from where
ever the charterer will see ﬁt to bunker which also causes us problems sometimes where the
charterer will say this type of fuel is ok and acceptable we will bunker, I will then look at
the sample and say ‘no, no, we can’t burn this for sulphur reasons, or I can’t burn this
because it is the wrong fuel for the engine’, obviously we have to protect that as well.
[Employer]
Concerns over the fuel supply had resulted in this company taking very elaborate steps
to ensure that the fuel they had delivered was compatible with all of their require-
ments. Given the length of time that it normally took to get sample results back from
the laboratory5, it seemed that their measures involved them in very careful forward
planning. The following extended extract describes their procedures for testing and the
time lag between the time of bunkering and the time when the fuel is cleared for use
and some of the consequences of this strategy for planning and for proﬁts:
We bunkered this up in Peterhead. That will go into the ship storage tank then, we will
not burn that fuel. I wait then because when the barge, the barge will come on and he will
give a sample of the fuel with ticket details and everything, that then is presented to us on
the fuel sample. But I won’t go off that sample, I take a secondary sample then, when
they are bunkering on the manifold we take it from out manifold, 10 minutes into the
delivery so you know you are getting a good grade of fuel. That will then go for
8 H. Sampson et al.
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sampling, I will wait for the 2 sample data’s to come back to myself and I look at the ﬁrst
sample from the barge or the truck, and then our sample, and I will look then at the
sulphur quantity, the densities, the viscosities, ﬁrstly because you want to see you haven’t
been short measured, but then you are looking at all the contaminants underneath. And
when I have looked then and I am satisﬁed with what quantities I see or contaminants
then I will contact the ship as well because the email will be sent over to them with the
attachment and we will say to the guys you know this fuel is acceptable to burn and you
are ok to do that.[. . .] It is within 2 weeks normally, it is quite a long process. [. . .]The
charterer can’t be greedy and just say you need to bunker the fuel now or we are going to
leave it to the last minute you put the fuel on and now you have to burn it, they can’t do
that. [Employer]
This example is particularly interesting because it highlights the extent to which the
monitoring of bunkers is already practiced by companies because of concerns relating
to fuel contaminants and quality which would seem to indicate that careful monitoring of
sulphur levels to guarantee compliance with sulphur-content requirements need not
necessarily place an additional operational burden on vessels.
Concerns over bunker tests by port state control
Although operators were keen to have a ‘level playing ﬁeld’ in relation to competition
with other shipping lines, and while they believed that such a level playing ﬁeld was
best established with effective enforcement of sulphur regulations, they were never-
theless anxious about the idea of port state control ofﬁcers sampling directly from their
tanks. One employer outlined his concerns that these might not be a ‘fair’ test as
follows:
So then we took it, it was .95 on the bunker note, it was .95 when it came out of the
reﬁnery, it might settle in the tanks, that tank might not be used for a few days that
could then come into the service tank and port state control ofﬁcers, again I have heard
them go into the bottom of the tank, you know which if there is anything anywhere
from you know previous parcels it might be towards the bottom of a tank, yeah?
[Employer]
The interviewee is referring here to the phenomenon known as ‘stratiﬁcation’ whereby
blended low-sulphur fuel oil may undergo partial separation in storage, which can result in
inadvertent non-compliance, when a sample is taken by port state from the vessel’s service
tank. Subsequently, this operator went further in outlining his view that he did not wish to
see port state control being exerted except in a highly targeted manner which would be
likely to exempt his company’s vessels from scrutiny. This appeared to be part of a
general view that regulation should be minimal which of course militates against the
establishment of a ‘level playing ﬁeld’ and is therefore in contradiction with his express
wish for the establishment of such. As he put it:
The people who openly breach regulations should be caught and should be, you know when
they are willingly trying to get around regulations, but things are in place for that and the
regime that is already here is very adequate for that. I don’t think there is a need for the
European commission or for member states to do more port state control than what they
already do, I don’t think there is a need because the regime is, it is an intelligence led regime,
like the customs. [Employer]
Where operators were more enthusiastic about the use of fuel sampling, they nevertheless
acknowledged that what was required was a system providing very rapid results. As one
explained:
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They [currently utilised laboratories] can provide the test results after seven days and this
does not work. In order to be able to hold back the vessel you need the test maybe four hours
back. . . [Employer]
They were therefore relatively supportive of the test kits that were being utilised by some
port state control ofﬁcers (e.g. in The Netherlands). Although these tests were generally
acknowledged to be less reliable than ‘send away’ laboratory tests, they were nevertheless
supported by some who held the view that:
No, I’ve just been looking it up when I was talking to them. I don’t know what the reliability
of those test kits is but I somehow doubt that it can be that bad otherwise they wouldn’t be
using it. [Employer]
Future concerns
Ship operators were anxious about the forthcoming tightening of the sulphur regulations
which were due to come into effect in the ECAs in 2015. The additional costs to shipping
fuel with a sulphur content of 0.1% or less was felt likely to threaten the competiveness of
the shipping industry. The price differentials were characterised as a ‘step change’ by one
operator who estimated that it would result in a substantial increase in fuel costs. He
suggested that:
The change from 1% to 0.1 is a step change, it is not a straight line, it is a step change. And
what it means is you have to burn distillate marine gas oil instead of residual fuel oil. And the
price premium for that is 70–80%. [Employer]
In relation to this price hike there were fears that the new regulation would precipitate a
‘modal shift’ in the transport of freight. This was because it was felt that the change in fuel
would increase operator costs so signiﬁcantly (a 20% increase was estimated by one
operator) that freight hauliers would not be able to meet the extra costs. As the above
employee went on to observe, such a modal shift would not only damage the shipping
industry, as some companies would inevitably fail, but could carry with it negative
consequences for ambient environmental quality.
We have some concerns mainly in relation to the 0.1% in 2015 which takes place within the
emission control areas. We believe, in the big picture that will cause a modal shift, it’ll change
ﬂows of trafﬁc, that can have the effect of putting more freight onto the roads. [. . .] it could
well be that freight hauliers choose to travel in their trucks [. . .] to Dover and use the very
short sea crossing or the tunnel in preference to using the longer sea transit. So we can see,
not only in the UK but across Europe signiﬁcant change to ﬂows of trafﬁc and that could
actually have an adverse environmental effect putting more cargo on the roads as opposed to
carrying it by sea—a less efﬁcient mode of transport, overland freight as opposed to at sea.
[Employer]
Favoured regulatory checks
As has already been noted, not all operators were in favour of stronger enforcement of the
regulations relating to air emissions in ECAs. However, those operators who were keen to
make sure that competitors did not get away with avoiding the regulations in order to
establish competitive advantage acknowledged that regulatory enforcement was not a
simple matter.
In spite of the perceived difﬁculties inherent in an ‘auditing’ solution involving checks
on bunker fuel delivery notes and samples of bunkers from service (or ‘day’) tanks, such a
solution was seen as more practical than the implementation of technical solutions
10 H. Sampson et al.
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requiring vessels to carry on board emissions monitoring equipment that could be
scrutinised by inspectors. As one interviewee explained, technical solutions seemed
difﬁcult:
I mean if you just see it from applicability point of view, to install such a [monitoring] system
on I don’t know, 40,000 vessels it just doesn’t seem feasible. So the testing I believe has to
happen while you’re in port. [Employer]
This operator favoured an auditing solution involving paper checks and fuel samples. It
was acknowledged however that testing in port did not resolve the problem of how to
ensure compliance amongst vessels in transit (i.e. going through an ECA but not calling at
a port in an ECA):
Of course you would have to ﬁgure something out on how to police transiting vessels. That
we don’t really know how one would handle yet but. . .[Employer]
Policy recommendations
A variety of policy recommendations arise from this study and these are detailed fully in a
report from the study which has been published on line (Bloor et al. 2013a). Three main
recommendations may be regarded of particular interest here however.
The ﬁrst is speciﬁc to inspection practice in the United Kingdom and relates to fuel
testing and the piloting of ‘sample kits’ as utilised in Germany, Holland and Sweden. The
pilot would provide the opportunity to establish the accuracy of different sampling/testing
methods with a view to the introduction of such sampling and testing in the future within
the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom (and other EU member states) will be obliged
to comply by 18 June 2014 with a revised EU sulphur directive issued on 21 November
2012 which requires member states to undertake frequent fuel sampling and testing
(European Union 2012).
The second recommendation relates to the publication of information on the Equasis
website about vessels non-compliant with the EU regulations on sulphur levels of fuel
burnt in EU ports. Currently, this will only occur if the port state control ofﬁcer noting the
deﬁciency records it as a deﬁciency in conjunction with the vessel’s safety management
system in breach of the IMO-ISM code. Such publication is seen to act as a major
deterrent to non-compliance and the recommendation is thus to extend the publicity
attendant to regulatory breaches.
The third recommendation relates to the development of the bunker fuel delivery
note. It is suggested that this document should always be written in English, should
record the sulphur content of fuel delivered (already an IMO requirement, but not
always complied with), should record the registration number of the supplier and
that it should be easy to determine if any fraudulent alterations have been made to
the note.
Conclusions
Currently it is possible to identify a number of difﬁculties relating to the enforcement of
emissions control regulations as they pertain to the North Sea and Baltic ECA. Such
difﬁculties relate to problems with fuel testing, the reliability of bunker fuel delivery notes
and technical problems associated with available laser ‘plume testing’ equipment.
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Notwithstanding these difﬁculties, at the current time it would appear that most companies
are complying with current regulations and that at least some non-compliance may be
inadvertent (produced as a result of the supply of ‘off-spec’ bunkers or associated with
poor fuel changeover techniques on vessels with single service tanks). Companies
expressed a desire for a level playing ﬁeld to be established in relation to exhaust
emissions from ships and yet some companies nevertheless resisted the idea that inspec-
tion should increase. Those companies in favour of greater inspection saw auditing
solutions such as the inspection of bunker delivery notes and oil record books alongside
fuel sampling as more practical than the installation of on-board emissions-monitoring
equipment. In relation to the strengthening of existing enforcement, recommendations
arising from the research include suggestions for improvements to the bunker delivery
note, developing effective fuel sampling techniques following experimental ‘piloting’ and
the ‘naming and shaming’ of companies that do not comply with EU emission regulations
on the ‘Equasis’ website.
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Notes
1. The paper does not focus on regulation of bunker suppliers per se which may be fertile ground
for future investigation. This paper is concerned with the broader enforcement of regulations
pertaining to ship emissions.
2. Fairway dues are charged to defray the costs of ice-breaking and coastal lights.
3. We note that inadvertent contamination of bunker supplies may occur due to incomplete tank
cleaning processes between deliveries of parcels of fuel of different speciﬁcation in terms of
sulphur content.
4. We note that small proﬁt margins may act as an incentive for fraud on the part of bunker
suppliers although we did not establish any direct evidence of such fraud nor of the potential
drivers for it within this study.
5. The operator told us that if they were ‘desperate’ they could get test results back faster and as
quickly as within a day but that this had cost implications so that standard practice was not to
do this.
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